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Weak State, Weak Civil Society:  





Most Arab states are categorized as authoritarian state-corporatist characterized by limited 
legitimacy, coercive security apparatus, and inefficient administration. Despite apparent similarities 
with the supreme state and primordial society, Arab states also possess distinct variants. In 
conservative state-corporatist states including Saudi Arabia and other kinship-based monarchies, the 
state is weak due to the low autonomy from and high immersion into particular social groups. On the 
other hand, in populist state-corporatist states, such as Egypt and other single-party ruled republics, 
the state is weak because of the high insulation from and low responsiveness toward the broad social 
structure. In a similar vein, while the civil society of the former is weak owing to the highly submissive 
attitudes toward the state, that of the latter is weak due to the radical and militant attitudes toward the 
state. 
 
Keywords: the state, civil society, state-society relations, corporatism, liberalism, state-





This study intends to delve into the origins and characteristics of the contemporary Arab 
state and civil society. This paper mainly argues that the corporatist paradigm is more 
appropriate in analyzing the state and civil society in Arab countries than the pluralism 
paradigm. According to the corporatist paradigm, the colonial legacy, the lack of a 
hegemonic class, and the primacy of the state, rather than peculiar political cultures, have 
been crucial in shaping exclusionary corporatism in the Arab world. It proposes that most 
Arab states are classified as authoritarian state-corporatist due to limited legitimacy, coercive 
security apparatus, and inefficient administration. Moreover, the Arab state-corporatist states, 
with low level of state strength and capacity, can be specified into two different types: the 
conservative state-corporatist states and the populist state-corporatist states. In conservative 
state-corporatist countries, the state is weak due to the excessively high level of immersion 
into the particular social groups through patronage networks while the civil society is also 
weak owing to the high level of submissive attitudes toward the state. On the other hand, in 
populist state-corporatist countries, the state is weak because of the remarkably high level of 
insulation from the broad and general social structure whereas the civil society is also weak 
owing to the high level of militancy toward the state.  
This article begins by positing competing paradigms for analyzing the state and civil 
society in general. Then it investigates into the question of which paradigm, between 
pluralism and corporatism, is more applicable to the Arab state and civil society analysis in 
particular. In the third section, these research questions are dealt in the context of colonial 
legacy, state building, and society formation process in the Arab world. It introduces crucial 
factors in establishing the contemporary nature of the Arab state and civil society. The fourth 
section considers the appropriate criteria to measure the strength and capacity of the Arab 
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state and civil society, and to classify them. This is followed by a short comparison with 
other non-Arab countries including Turkey, Iran, and Israel in the region. Finally, I conclude 
with the argument that the Arab state and civil society in both conservative and populist 
state-corporatist countries are weak but in somewhat different way.  
 
 
2. THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: PLURALISM VERSUS CORPORATISM 
 
The two main contrasting paradigms for conceptualizing the state are pluralism and 
corporatism. The state, in pluralism, is viewed as a collection of individuals occupying 
particular official roles and as an arena within which societal actors struggle to insure the 
success of their own particular preferences through electoral pressure and lobbies. Although 
the state involves consultation with interest groups, its role is quite passive as a literal referee 
without political authority (Dahl 1971, Downs 1957, North 1990, Olson 1965).  
In contrast with the atomistic view of pluralist paradigm where the concept of the state as 
a political system is sometimes too vague and narrow, the state in the corporatism paradigm 
is the decisional and authoritative structure linked with the associationally- organized 
interests of civil society. Since corporatism is a political concept which is premised neither 
on the supremacy of the individual nor on the supremacy of class in institutional arrangement, 
it affords a greater role of the state. Thus, the state directs the economy and manipulates 
social groups (Ayubi 1995; Cantori 1999; Grant 1985; Schmitter 1979). Although the state as 
an autonomous unity in statist theory or non-pluralist paradigm is often too idealistic, the 
corporatist state generally has powerful incentives to engage in bargaining and negotiation 
with interest associations and sometimes even create and license them (Evans et al. 1985; 
Hall 1997; Krasner 1984; Mitchell 1991). 
In a similar manner to the state debate, there are two different conceptions of civil society, 
a network of institution mediating between the individuals and the state. The pluralist version 
of civil society highlights ‘civility’ and views civil society as an informal network embodied 
in the horizontal civic bonds (Putnam 1993). The realm of civil society in pluralism is quite 
narrow because it distinguishes political and economic society from civil society and 
sometimes excludes religious organizations from it.  
In contrast, the corporatist conception of civil society shows a broader scope by 
encompassing legislative assemblies, political parties, and interest associations which include 
trade unions, business groups, and professional syndicates (Schmitter and Karl 1991). 
Interest associations in corporatism generally consist of a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically-ordered, and functionally- differentiated units. 
Through this associational and collective channel and with collaboration with political 
parties, the interests are expressed toward the state (Ayubi 1995; Schmitter 1979).
1
 
In pursuit of a useful paradigm for understanding the state and civil society in the Arab 
world, it has been contended that corporatism is more valid than pluralism in the following 
two ways (Al-Sayyid 1995; Ayubi 1995; Cantori 1997; Cantori 1999; Ehteshami and 
                                                          
1 Pluralists and corporatists offer opposing political remedies and divergent images of the institutional 
form that such a modern system of interest representation will take. The former suggest spontaneous 
formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension, and competitive interaction; the latter 
advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification, and complementary 
interdependence (Schmitter 1979: 16).  




Murphy 1996; Kamrava 2002; Turner 1984; Zubaida 1992). First, corporatism implies the 
state’s autonomous and interventionist role which is easily found in most Arab states. 
However, pluralism neglects the influence of the state. It is closely tied to the specific 
mechanisms of political representation and participation, which is less efficacious in dealing 
with the Arab politics, given the lack of institutional mechanisms and devices, such as voting, 
elections, and parties.  
As a matter of fact, a powerful state defines the critical context in which capitalism 
emerges in late developing countries. Regarding the primacy of the state, there have been 
growing theoretical arguments and conceptual developments. The state both reacts to social 
forces and shapes the direction of those forces, in turn. Although the state, because of its 
penchant for intervening in the economy, is viewed as the impediment to capitalist 
development, it remains the only available instrument for carrying out all the market and 
political reform prescriptions. This is what is known as the “orthodox paradox (Snider 
1996)”. The solution does not involve removing the state from the development processes, 
but rather changing the way the state plays its role. In the Arab world, while a more 
democratic order cannot be built through the current state power, it cannot be built without 
the state power. In other words, government remains crucial to the project of political and 
economic reform in the region.
2
 
Second, with regard to the cultural specificity of the Arab world where the historic-
intellectual prerequisites for individualism and secularism are weak (Inglehart 1997; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005), pluralist paradigm does not seem to capture the realities. Instead, 
corporatism whose original view covers familial, communitarian, moral, and organic nature 
is culturally more compatible with the Arab countries. The contemporary Arab states appear 
to correspond to the Gramscian category of corporative state where the state is everything, 
but the civil society is primordial and gelatinous in terms of its economic interests and 
functions. As evidence of contention, the corporatist characteristics of political culture in the 
Arab world, where the interest of the community, not the individual, comes first and 
consensus, not pluralist competition, is prized (Ayubi 1995; Cantori 1997; Cantori 1999; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Okruhlik 2005).  
With regard to the civil society, it seems more persuasive to include political parties into 
the realm of civil society given that in nearly all Arab countries, most opposition political 
parties have no chance of forming the government. Also, the idea of a pays reel which 
conveys a broader understanding of civil society may include illegal opposition parties and 
associations among its set of relational networks (Al-Sayyid 1995; Henry 1999; Norton 
1995; Ottaway and Carothers 2004). In fact, the contemporary political Islamists in the Arab 
countries are the principal stimulus to civil society. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Efforts since the 1990s to promote theoretical integration among the state-centered approaches have 
produced the “new institutionalisms” (Hall 1997). These are rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism, and they are interest-based, structure-oriented, and 
idea-oriented approaches, respectively (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997: 3-16). These approaches have 
evinced a common interest in the role of states in development and democracy. The historical 
institutionalist approach most explicitly focuses on the diversity of institutional arrangements rooted 
in their own historical landscapes in order to explain the primary role of state which constrains actors’ 
perceptions and choices (Evans et al. 1985; Hall 1997; Mahoney 2003; Zysman 1983). 
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3. COLONIAL LEGACY, STATE BUILDING, AND SOCIAL FORMATION IN THE 
ARAB WORLD 
 
This paper has established that it is more plausible to apply corporatism than pluralism to 
the state and civil society analysis in the Arab world given their power structure, political 
system, socioeconomic structure, and even political culture. Then, what is the most crucial 
factor in establishing the corporatist nature in the Arab state, civil society, and the 
relationship between the two?  
The colonial era resulted in the incorporation of the Arab countries into the capitalist 
world system and in the consolidation of internally-bureaucratic state and an externally-
territorial state. However, the colonial legacy contributed to the partial and unstable nature of 
state-building and social formation in the post-colonial Arab countries. The most problematic 
legacy from colonial era is the lopsided nature of the post-colonial countries, that is, the 
underdeveloped class structure and the overdeveloped state in the newly capitalist countries. 
The state apparatus in colonial period was not created by a national bourgeoisie but by a 
foreign colonial one which overinflated the size of the bureaucratic machine, especially its 
military and security wing to serve its own purpose and to confront any possible resistance 
(Anderson 1987; Ayubi 1995; Henry and Springborg 2001; Migdal 1988; Owen 2004).  
Thus, the rulers of the post-colonial state were also able to produce much the same type 
of effect via the creation of authoritarian system. In such situations, the social classes have 
been excessively dependent on the state, and the primacy of state within social formation has 
compensated for the absence of a domestic hegemonic bourgeois class, which resulted from 
the embryonic class structure in the immediate post-independent countries (Jang 2008: 237-
8). 
Regarding the notion of corporatism which is premised on non-supreme individual or 
class in structural setting, an important concept is articulation which is more likely in 
situations where no one mode of production or no one class has emerged to dominate. It was 
also at transitional stages where a certain mode of production or a certain class loses its 
supremacy without another having yet taken its place (Ayubi 1995: 27). Owing to the non-
hegemonic class and the primacy of the state in the Arab world, there is technical 
arrangement by the state of articulations among the modes of production in economic aspect, 
coercion in political aspect, persuasion in ideological aspect and within each of the three 
modes. Capitalism injected into the Arab countries by the colonial powers has been 
articulated in different forms with pre-capitalist modes of production, such as pastoral-
nomadism in some countries and semi-feudal or semi-commercial agriculture in others, and 
with a state-capitalist mode of production regardless of their declared ideologies (Ayubi 
1995; Richards and Waterbury 1990). Moreover, there are combining articulations between 
certain economic and technical elements of the capitalist mode of production and certain 
social and cultural elements of pre-capitalist modes of coercion and persuasion, such as 
political tribalism, or patrimonialism in the Arab countries (Henry 1996; Migdal 1988; Owen 
2004).  
In sum, the corporatism in the Arab countries is artificially established by the above, and 
the overemphasized role of the state with the absence a hegemonic class has been more 
exaggerated in order to promote delayed capitalist development in the name of national 
interest. This also implies that the state has been more autonomous from the civil society in 
their relationship. 





4. TYPOLOGY OF THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: WEAK 
STATE AND WEAK CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Concerning the typology of the corporatist states in the Arab world, there are two main 
subtypes of corporatism according to different structures of power and influence: state-
corporatism and societal-corporatism. The former tends to be associated with political 
systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; 
elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated by a weak single party; 
executive authorities are ideologically exclusive; and are such that political subcultures based 
on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed. On the contrary, the second is 
found in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial units; open 
electoral processes and party systems; ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive 
authorities (Ayubi 1995: 184; Schmitter 1979: 21-2). The state in state corporatism is 
dominant, commanding and is, not surprisingly, contestational with, alienated from its civil 
society. Hence, it is persuasive to classify the Arab states into the state corporatist category. 
Then, why did the Arab states develop the exclusionary state-corporatism rather than 
societal-corporatism pervasive in democratic welfare states despite their similar and common 
culture as communitarian and non-individualistic characteristics? Given the different 
outcomes between state and societal corporatist states based on the commonly shared 
cultural background, political culture is not the most crucial determinant of political context. 
Accordingly, it implies that the authoritarian and overdeveloped state power in the Arab 
countries is not due to the peculiar political culture (Harik 2006) but due to the colonial 
legacy as a structural and institutional cause.  
As for state strength and capacity, the Arab state-corporatist states are usually perceived 
weak due to limited legitimacy or hegemony, low level of taxation capacity, coercive 
security apparatus, and inefficient administration. Also, these weak states similarly possess 
authoritarian regime despite their different or even contradictory ideology bases. Mainly, the 
Arab states are fierce states that have to resort to coercion and repression in order to preserve 
themselves, but they are not strong. They are weak and hard. To avoid any confusion over 
the nature of the state between ‘strong,’ ‘hard,’ ‘fierce,’ and ‘coercive’ on the one hand, and 
‘weak,’ and ‘soft,’ on the other, one needs to differentiate these vague and arguable notions. 
The idea of state strength and capacity being strong or weak is based on the degree of 
legitimacy and institutional quality including taxation capacity, law enforcement, and 
administrative efficiency. On the other hand, the hard or soft describes the nature of the 
power that is exercised (Anderson 1987; Ayubi 1995; Evans 1995; Fukuyama 2004; Henry 
and Springborg 2001; Migdal 1997; Salame 1990; Zubaida 1992; Zysman 1983). In figure 1, 
the Arab states as state-corporatist fall into the category of weak-hard state. Namely, given 
the differentiated and sophisticated concept about the state, the Arab states are hard with 
regard to their coercive apparatus, but as a whole they are weak because of their lack of 
legitimacy and low institutional quality.  
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Figure 1. State Typology by Differentiated State Concept 
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So far, the Arab states are classified as weak and hard state-corporatist states. However, 
regarding the basic but apparent variant characteristics within the same category, there are 
two subtypes of corporatism for the Arab states: conservative corporatism and populist 
corporatism. The Arab corporatism ranges between a more organic, solidaristic and 
communitarian strand at one end of the spectrum, and more organizational, interest-based, 
populist, and mobilizational strand at the other. Conservative, kinship-based monarchies, 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, other GCC countries in the oil exporting Gulf area, Morocco, 
and Jordan are illustrative of the first strand. Radical and populist single party ruled republics 
including Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are illustrative of the second 
(Ayubi 1995; Henry and Springborg 2001). This dichotomy is principally similar to other 
works’ typology classified by obviously distinct political system and ruling ideology 
(Hammoudi 1997; Owen 2004; Richards and Waterbury 1990).  
Given a more differentiated state classification which distinguishes conservative state-
corporatist states and populist state-corporatist states, it seems feasible to specify their 
common weakness in a more detailed and distinguished way. Although one may recall that 
state strength and capacity and the notion of taxation ability were main components in the 
institutional quality criteria, a different criteria should be set up for the Arab states. 
Concerning the public finance resources, the taxing capability of the conservative state-
corporatist states and the populist states show contrasting features. Because of the abundant 
oil revenues, the former tends to achieve low tax extraction by establishing patron-client 
network. The latter displays excessive taxation, going over the optimal level and shows some 
evidence of discretionary authority. Therefore, a new notion of state strength and capacity is 
needed to cover these contrasting features. The notion also concerns the state’s insulation 
from the particular societal interests and its immersion in the broad social structure at the 
same time. In doing so, the state might facilitate a mutual interaction between the state and 
society, or at least allows quasi – political pluralism where societal actors can have a room to 
act (Evans 1995).  
The conservative state-corporatist states display intensely high immersion but low 
insulation from the particular social groups. Yet, the populist state-corporatist states feature 
excessively high insulation and low immersion. Specifically, figure 2 is an effort to depict 
the different weaknesses of the conservative state-corporatism and populist state-corporatism. 
Both conservative and populist states are commonly captured by the groups who seek to 




preserve of the privileges. They thus try to keep the status quo by striving to co-opt other 
social groups in the civil society, often relying on force (Bellin 2004; Brownlee 2007). 
However, they are weak in different ways as figure 2 illustrates. This implies different 
institutional arrangements between the state and civil society in those two states, particularly 
concerning the finance revenues.  
The populist states usually attain the resources by way of nationalizing private enterprises. 
They often tend to show excessive tax extraction from the broad society going over an 
appropriate level by exercising a predatory power in an isolative and insulating way 
(Langhor 2004; Snider 1996). Therefore, the states are more inclined towards the insulation 
aspect. On the other hand, the conservative monarchies due to the abundance of their oil 
revenue, show a rather low level of tax extraction. The  availability of financial resources in 
these rentier states not only supports the coercive apparatus of the state but also sustains 
massive social welfare programs. In doing so, it fuels powerful patrimonial networks under 
crony capitalism based on family, tribe, and proximity to the ruling elite embodied in the 
logic of “no taxation, no representation” (Herb 2005; Karl 1997; Luciani 1995; Ross 2001; 
Ross 2008). Accordingly, the conservative states are closer to the immersion axis compared 
to the populist states.  
In short, these weak states are undemocratic and coercive. Neither is weaker than other, 
but they are both weak in a somewhat different way. Although the late 1980s witnessed 
liberalization trends in the region, in the midst of threats and opportunities of globalization, 
most of the economic and political liberalization were achieved as regime projects and were 
certainly not intended to lead to a gradual loss of power, but rather to consolidate and 
reinvigorate the power and legitimacy of politically, economically and ideologically 
weakened regimes (Brumberg 2002; Eickelman 2002; Diamond and Brumberg 2003; Lust-
Okar 2004). 
Meanwhile, other non-Arab countries in the Middle East, namely Turkey, Iran, and Israel, 
are relatively pluralist and strong states with high immersion and high insulation. They are 
the only regional states with at least conditional democracy, probably due to the low intensity 
or absence of the colonial experience (Diamond 2002; Henry and Springborg 2001). 
However, this high level of state strength and capacity should be viewed in relative terms, in 
comparison with other Arab state-corporatist states.  
Given the differentiated natures, strength, and capacity of the Arab state-corporatist states, 
one needs to reconsider and differentiate the typology of the Arab civil society as well. Is the 
civil society in the Arab countries too weak to challenge the power of the state? Or is it too  
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Figure 2. The State in Conservative and Populist State-Corporatist Countries 
 JI HYANG JANG 88 
 
strong, resulting in a state that overly depends on force to maintain control? According to  
figure 3, the civil society of the conservative state-corporatist countries is weak, feeble, and 
submissive because most of the associations are based on the clientage network, whose 
members traded their loyalty for the patronage and protection as emphasized earlier 
(Diamond and Brumberg 2003; Herb 2004). Thus, they are in no position to play an 
intermediary role between the individuals and the state.  
On the other hand, some of the societal actors in the populist state-corporatist countries 
are too radical for the state to tolerate and to be included within the system. Those societal 
actors are mainly the Islamist oppositions or Islamic fundamentalists, and the incumbent 
regimes lack tolerance particularly toward these groups. In fact, the Islamist oppositions have 
illustrated greater militancy and less coordination with other civil society groups, which 
result in greater repression by the state, rather than some type of mutual accommodation 
based on bargaining. The associations of radical and militant Islamist movements tend to 
promote their slogans regardless of the deleterious consequences for the civil society as a 
whole. In other words, they are collectively uncoordinated within the civil society as a whole 
and lack centralized bargaining power at the national-level with the state (Gerges 2005, Jang 
2008).  
However, in terms of organizational depth, the civil society of the populist corporatist 
countries shows higher levels than that of the conservative corporatist countries. Among the 
civil society organizations of the populist state-corporatist countries, those of Egypt for 
instance, display more developed organizational forms and are less marginalized than others 
as figure 4 shows. This is largely due to the different intensity of the colonial situation, since 
more repressive and brutal colonial occupation  produced overdeveloped police, military, and 
security wing of the state apparatus, and thus prevented civil society from extending their 
associations.  
For example, the French colonization in Algeria was much longer and intense than that in 
Tunisia. Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, where the colonial authorities did not implement 
radical changes in the socio-cultural or political structures, the situation was different in 
Algeria which was declared a full and integral part of France, which resulted in a 
dismantlement of much of the original society. Neither the French nor the authoritarian state 
of Algeria permitted the public expression of civil concerns, and thus, the social classes 
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Figure 3. Civil Society in the Arab World 
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Figure 4. Civil Society Development in Populist State-Corporatist Countries 
 
 
could never be organized and not to mention being invited to any bargaining table (El-Kenz 
1991; Hammoudi 1997; Henry 1999; Langohr 2004; Wickham 2004). Therefore, as figure 4 
indicates, the capacity of the civil society to coordinate with internal associations and bargain 
with the state has been greater in Tunisia than Algeria. As a matter of fact, as a “veiled” 
protectorate, Egypt was never as intensively colonized as either Tunisia or Algeria. 
Accordingly, it has displayed even greater capacity to spawn Islamist associations and parties 
(Henry and Springborg 2001). The more coercive the states, the more radical and militant 
civil society. 
In sum, as figure 3 illustrates, a strong civil society should possess internal-coordination 
within itself and bargaining power vis-à-vis the state. Some of the societal actors are too 
weak and feeble to challenge the power of the state while others are too radical. Neither a too 
submissive civil society of the conservative state-corporatist countries nor a too radical one 
of the populist state-corporatist countries can be considered as strong. Again, the primacy of 
the state has preempted the development of and compensated for the absence of strong 
societal groups. The power configuration of societal actors has been excessively dependent 
on the absolute primacy of the state. Therefore, the undemocratic characteristics of the 
incumbent regimes in the Arab state-corporatist countries have been reflected in their state-





This study examined the state, civil society, and state-society relations in the 
contemporary Arab world in comparative corporatist perspectives. Most Arab states can be 
classified as authoritarian state-corporatist and characterized by limited legitimacy and 
excessive dependence upon external revenues without infrastructural power. Also, they often 
resort to raw coercion in order to preserve their invested interests. The states are not strong 
but fierce, coercive, and hard. Indeed, most of these weak states in the region possess similar 
drawbacks despite their distinguished or even contradictory ideology bases. 
Despite the fundamental similarities, the Arab states show critical differences at the same 
time. In conservative state-corporatism, such as kinship-based monarchies, the state is weak 
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because it is too immersed in the particular social groups through patronage networks while 
the civil society is also weak since it is too submissive to the state. In populist state-
corporatism, such as single-party rule republics, the state is weak because it is too insulated 
from the broad social structure whereas the civil society is weak since it is too militant and 
radical toward the state. Neither is weaker than other, but they are weak in a different way.  
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